The Role of Multilateral Negotiations in EU and U.S. Federal Procurement Practices UrT 2026 no 1 p. 1

This article examines the persistent divergence between the United States and the European Union regarding the use of multilateral negotiations. While both systems aim to achieve the best value for money, their operational methodologies differ starkly: the U.S. federal system has normalized competitive negotiations as a primary procurement procedure, whereas EU contracting authorities remain heavily reliant on formalized open and restricted procurement procedures. Drawing on qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews with procurement professionals, this research argues that the EU’s underutilization of negotiated procedures is not a result of legal barriers, but of a deeply embedded institutional culture of risk aversion. The study identifies a “quantification trap” in the EU, where an overreliance on rigid, formula-based scoring serves as a defensive mechanism against judicial challenge, often at the expense of substantive contract quality. In contrast, the U.S. system treats negotiation as a strategic extension of competition, allowing for professional discretion and risk mitigation.

The findings reveal that while the U.S. model excels in technical problem-solving, it faces challenges regarding incumbency advantages. Conversely, the EU’s focus on transparency leads to over-specification, thereby excluding innovation. The paper concludes that closing the gap between these two systems requires more than legislative reform; it demands a shift in EU procurement culture toward professionalization and the reframing of negotiations as a legitimate, standard instrument for strategic governance.

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